Event overview
The leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya al-Sinwar, was killed by Israeli forces in Rafah on 16 October. The killing of the Palestinian leader is a major victory for Israel, that appears to have occurred largely by chance. Conflict in Gaza has endured for over a year now and fighting in the Strip continues at a steady, albeit dwindling intensity. Israel continues to launch airstrikes against purported Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip on a near-daily basis; the local health ministry claims that at least 43,600 Palestinian people have been killed in these strikes since 7 October 2023, while over 100,000 have been injured. Militants in Gaza continue to clash with the IDF, frequently launching ambushes, as well as mortar and rocket attacks. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have recently announced plans to further split Gaza using corridors, seemingly with the goal of blunting the threat posed by militants in the territory should Israeli troops eventually withdraw, as well as potentially establishinga long-term presence in northern Gaza. Israeli security forces also continue to conduct semi-frequent operations targeting militants in the West Bank and appear likely to continue doing so for some time.
As military operations in Gaza persist at a comparatively slower tempo, the IDF continues to engage other Iran-backed adversaries across the Middle East. Most recently, on 10 November, a target in the Sayeda Zainab district south of the Syrian capital Damascus was struck, reportedly killing seven people and wounding at least 20 more. This aerial attack came less than a week after Israel’s air force struck purported Hezbollah assets south of Damascus on 4 November. Syria’s defence ministry confirmed both attacks, although maintained that civilians and non-military sites had been struck on both occasions. These strikes against alleged Hezbollah targets come as fighting between the Lebanon-based group and Israel entered a new level of intensity several weeks ago.
Since late September, the Israeli military has significantly stepped up its air campaign against targets across Lebanon, while ground troops entered the country’s south in early October. Israel has managed to eliminate an overwhelming majority of Hezbollah’s leadership, including former leader Hassan Nasrallah, and cleared portions of southern Lebanon, though has suffered losses in the process. The IDF has seemingly met its primary mission aim: to survey and destroy Hezbollah military infrastructure in the first line of villages within a five-kilometer radius of the Israel-Lebanon border. Neither the military nor the government have given any major indications that Israeli forces will soon wind down their operations in Lebanon, however, and there has been speculation that preparations may be underway to advance to the second line. Such a move would be both tricky and controversial, with poorer weather conditions setting in and levels of discontent building due to the continued calling up of reservists. The IDF has reported a notable decrease in the rate of reserve troops showing up for duty in recent weeks compared to a year ago.
Airstrikes against Hezbollah targets continue to impact swathes of Lebanon, particularly in the country’s east, south, and in Beirut. The southern suburbs of the capital – known as a Hezbollah stronghold –have been particularly impacted, with deaths being reported daily as a result. Bombardments and large explosions continue to be recorded in close proximity to Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY), the country’s only international airport, occurring most recently on 6 and 7 November. The airport has yet to halt operations entirely, although most carriers have maintained their pause on flights to and from the facility.
Israel’s recent military operations against Hezbollah have had a tangible effect on the Iran-backed group’s offensive capabilities, with a senior IDF source stating on 10 November that it had nullified the group’s ability to conduct ground attacks in Israel and significantly depleted its stockpiles of long-range weapons such as missiles, rockets, and drones. However, Hezbollah still possesses the ability to strike Israeli territory, with the group’s new secretary general, Naim Qassem, stating in a speech that his organization retains “tens of thousands of trained resistance combatants” awaiting combat and that its drones and missiles can strike the entirety of Israel. Demonstrating this, a Hezbollah projectile struck a vehicle in the carpark of Ben Gurion Airport (TLV) on 6 November, temporarily impacting operations at the airport. Moreover, two waves of rocket barrages were launched toward Haifa by the Lebanese group on 11 November. A majority of the 90 projectiles were intercepted, although four people were injured in the Haifa Bay area as several of the projectiles evaded Israeli air defenses. Earlier in the day, three people were injured following a rocket attack in Kafr Bi’ina, near the city of Carmiel. The two attacks on 11 November underscore the elevated threat facing northern Israel, with the shorter distances between launch sites in Lebanon and targets in the country’s north providing Israel less time to intercept the projectiles and warn citizens.
Cross-border strikes have forced TLV to temporarily cease departures and arrivals on a number of occasions in recent weeks. Most notably, the airport closed for several hours on 1 October, due to Iran’s more than 180-strong missile attack against Israel that left one person dead. This attack was largely repelled by the Israeli military and its allies, though some projectiles struck military installations and other sites. Following the strikes, Israel immediately vowed to retaliate but remained quiet over when and how it would do so. The response came within a month, as Israel launched a series of airstrikes against military targets in Iran on 26 October. The attack killed four servicemen and damaged air-defense systems, weapons productions facilities, and missile launch sites.
The past weekend has seen the U.S. and the U.K. resume strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen,launching them over two consecutive nights. Explosions were reported in the Amran and Saada governorates, north of the capital of Sanaa, where the U.S. has carried out strikes in the past, although there were few details on the targets. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the facilities struck housed advanced weapons that have been used to target U.S. and other coalition warships, as well as commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Internal tensions remain high amongst segments of the Israeli political leadership and society. Thousands protested in locations such as Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and other urban centers in response to the sacking of Israel’s defence minister, Yoav Gallant. Protesters in Tel Aviv blocked traffic on the Ayalon Highway, a location that is frequently targeted during instances of civil unrest. Foreign Minister Israel Katz, a hawkish ally of Netanyahu, will replace Gallat. Since the conflict in Gaza began over a year ago, Gallant had frequently clashed with Netanyahu over a deal with Hamas to bring back hostages, as well as the exemption of Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox citizens from the military. Gallant has since stated that conditions in Gaza are conducive for a deal but that the government has no interest in finding a settlement, owing in part to the aspirations of far-right members of the governing coalition, who wield significant influence over Netanyahu.
Impact
Iran is widely expected to retaliate against Israel, likely further perpetuating the ongoing series of tit-for-tat attacks that began on 1 April, when Israel killed several high-ranking officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Damascus. How Tehran will respond remains unclear, although there has been speculation that it may launch a more complex attack than the one seen on 1 October, potentially by using more weapons and / or more powerful warheads. During the previous Iranian attack on Israel, several projectiles were able to evade air-defense systems with damaging effect. Israel has formidable defenses, but they are not infallible – a notion also demonstrated by the deadly Hezbollah drone attack on a base in northern Israel in October, as well as the recent strikes on TLV and Haifa. Consequently, a more powerful attack would present higher risks to those on the ground in Israel, even if Israel is aided in its defense by allies such as the U.S. Iran is unlikely to deliberately target civilian locations or try cause significant loss of life or damage, but this scenario cannot be ruled out entirely.
There have also been reports suggesting that Iran’s response may be conducted by Iraqi Shia militias, a claim dismissed by the Iraqi government, who maintains that these reports are a false pretext to justify military actions against it. Pro-Iran groups have launched semi-frequent attacks against Israel since October 2023, claiming at least three attacks in the past 10 days. But these assaults have seldom been composed of anything more than a small number of drones or rockets at a time – nothing on the scale of what has been recently speculated. However, these militant groups are known to possess ballistic and cruise missiles, which may be favored by Iran due to the considerably shorter amount of time it would take weapons fired from Iraq to reach Israel. These reports suggest that Tehran may be seeking to catch Israel by surprise with its next attack, withprevious assaults having largely been anticipated in the hours leading up to their launch. Should Iran choose this option, the risks facing aircraft in the region would elevate dramatically, as civilian air traffic has previously had to suspend operations to the likes of Iran, Iraq, Israel, and other destinations, as well as avoid certain airspace, in preparation for impending attacks.
Rhetoric from Iranian officials suggests that their retaliation is more likely to occur in the coming days or weeks rather than months. Indeed, while the exact timing of this anticipated attack remains unclear, Iran is highly likely to act before the inauguration of Donald Trump, the next U.S. president, in January 2025. The election of Trump on 6 November has arguably provided more clarity on how fighting in Gaza and Lebanon may culminate, which appeared to be impacted by the unknown result of the U.S. elections. Trump’s foreign policy during his last presidency at times seemed to be erratic and unpredictable, and there is no guarantee how he will approach the current hostilities in the Middle East. The Netanyahu administration has seemingly been pleased by the election of Trump, possibly hoping his appointment will help win U.S. recognition of an annexation settlements in the West Bank, as well as potentially parts of northern Gaza.
However, with approximately three months until Trump takes office, the major actors embroiled in the Middle East hostilities – particularly members of the Iranian coalition – may seek to take advantage of the remaining time the U.S. is led by the more predictable outgoing Biden administration. Although Israel will likely feel similarly emboldened, potentially deterring the coalition from any major provocatory actions. Conversely, Biden is reportedly considering enacting more stringent measures on arms supplies to Israel and potentially a failure to veto anti-Israel resolutions at the UN Security Council in its final few months– moves that could antagonize Israel and lead it to double down on its military operations.
Finding resolutions to the conflicts in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon is believed to be among Trump’s primary aims once he takes office, with it being speculated he wants to continue reshaping the Middle East as he did in his previous term. Although Trump is also expected to continue his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. With Israel seemingly having achieved many of its military aims in Gaza and Lebanon, and expected to come under increased pressure from Trump to “finish the job” in these two conflicts, fighting in the two theatres now looks more likely to end in the coming months. How this will happen remains unclear. Shortly after the Republican victory, Qatar expelled the Hamas leadership residing in the country, allegedly due to their failure to accept any ceasefire in Gaza. Doha also announced it would halt its role in trying to mediate a deal due to lack of political will from all participants, reducing the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement in the near term.
Israeli media outlets report that Netanyahu has been increasingly optimistic about the potential of reaching a diplomatic solution and ceasefire deal in Lebanon, which would likely be a similar framework to the UN Resolution 1701, a deal which concluded the Second Lebanon War in 2006. But Israel also seems to be making plans to return displaced civilians to the country’s north without a ceasefire agreement, with it being reported that three IDF divisions could deploy to the Israel-Lebanon border after finishing operations in southern Lebanon – making it difficult to ascertain how the Israeli government plans on dealing with Hezbollah over the long term.
In the near term, however, Israeli ground and aerial campaigns are likely to persist, and may even intensify, as the country looks to inflict final damage to its adversaries. Moreover, while Trump has urged Israel to “finish the job”, there is a level of ambiguity to this statement, meaning further upticks in violence remain possible. Hezbollah, and to a lesser extent other Iran-backed groups, will likely continue targeting Israel with rockets, drones, and missiles over the coming months.
Considerations
Those operating in the region, particularly in Israel and Lebanon, but also potentially Iraq, should ensure they prepare for some of the elevated risks by constantly updating their contingency plans and making personnel aware of them. A host of airlines have cancelled or reduced their routes serving Lebanon and Israel due to the risk of conflict, reducing the availability of commercial options to depart both countries. The severity of conflict risks facing those travelling to and from Israel and Lebanon via air routes has been underscored in the past week by the attacks in close proximity to each country’s only international airport.
Additional major air attacks launched by Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, or other Iranian-linked groups are highly likely over the near-to-medium term. Such assaults carry a high potential to disrupt aviation operations across the region, potentially with little-tono warning. While Iran is expected to launch a considerable air attack against Israel soon, potentially from Iraq, Tehran has previously been speculated to retaliate via targeting Israeli nationals or interests abroad. Accordingly, Israeli nationals should exercise increased caution while travelling outside the country.
Similarly, the recent targeting of Israeli football fans in Amsterdam underscored the inflammatory and divisive nature of the events that have been witnessed in the Middle East over the past year. On a number of occasions, hostilities in the region have shown themselves to be capable of spilling over across borders in a variety of ways, including in countries relatively distanced from the Middle East. Tensions along religious and ethnic lines remain high in many societies in the West, as well as the wider world, in part due to these hostilities. As the events in Amsterdam show, these tensions have the potential to be triggered by previously unaccounted for flashpoints and can violently manifest themselves at short notice. Businesses and their personnel should reflect on how they may still face risks in locations that may initially appear to be distanced from the ongoing events in the Middle East.