Event overview
Over the past 24 hours, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has reached an intensity that is unprecedented since it reignited in October 2023. While the level of force and scope of Israeli military activity had already increased markedly over the last week, the acceleration of Israel’s aerial campaign witnessed on 23 September is the most unambiguous indication yet that the conflict has entered a new and more serious phase. Although the international community has called for restraint from both sides, there is currently no sign that either Israel or Hezbollah are willing to cede to each other’s demands.
It has become apparent that attacks on Hezbollah involving explosives hidden in the group’s communications devices conducted on 17-18 September – then viewed as a significant escalation that prompted Hezbollah’s leader to state that an “unprecedented blow” had been inflicted on his group and vow “just punishment” – was a prelude for a far more significant Israeli operation.
Taking advantage of the blow it has dealt to Hezbollah, Israel has escalated its aerial campaign in Lebanon, conducting an increasing number of airstrikes against purported Hezbollah missile and rocket launch sites, as well as the group’s leadership. Most significantly, on 23 September, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claimed to have struck 1,600 Hezbollah targets over 24 hours, by far the most since its 2006 war against the group. The strikes left at least 492 dead, according to the Lebanese authorities, in addition to displacing tens of thousands from southern Lebanon.
Although Israeli strikes have mainly focussed on southern Lebanon, no part of the country is immune from conflict risks. This was illustrated by a strike against a high-rise building on 20 September in Beirut that killed a “top Hezbollah” commander and left 45 other people dead and 66 wounded, as well as the range of locations targeted throughout 23 September – some of which were almost 200kms from the Israel-Lebanon border.
Since the 17-18 September attacks, Hezbollah’s response has been relatively muted. The group has succeeded in launching hundreds of rockets, missiles, and drones against targets located relatively deep inside Israeli territory, including in the suburbs of Haifa. However, despite signs that Hezbollah is willing to utilise its vast stockpile of over 120,000 rockets and missiles – long seen as the most potent deterrent for Israeli military operations – and field its more advanced weapons, the nature of this response has not deterred Israeli military operations.
There are now heightened concerns that the situation could tip into a full-blown war. Several governments have issued further advice to their citizens, urging them to leave Lebanon. The current escalation has also prompted airlines to suspend services to Lebanon and Israel, with some pausing flights until 2025.
Assessment and outlook
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah will almost certainly continue to escalate over the coming days. Indeed, neither Israel nor Hezbollah have shown any indication that they will back down from their respective demands, with Israel demanding a redeployment of Hezbollah weapons and fighters away from the shared border to allow displaced Israeli citizens to return, and Hezbollah seeking an Israeli ceasefire in Gaza. Moreover, both sides face significant pressure to continue on their current course, with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu under domestic political scrutiny over the security of the northern border and Hezbollah needing to act robustly to maintain its credibility, having arguably failed to respond proportionately to previous Israeli acts.
The form this escalation will take remains to be seen, though all foreseeable eventualities involve a marked increase in conflict risks and conflict-related disruption for those operating in both Israel and Lebanon. Israel’s military appears to be operating with relative impunity over Lebanon, as highlighted by ongoing airstrikes, which Hezbollah are seemingly unable to counter. It is highly likely that airstrikes will continue to occur until Israel is either satisfied that Hezbollah’s offensive capabilities are degraded to the point where the return of Israeli citizens to northern Israel is manageable or where Hezbollah is compelled to act in line with Israeli demands.
Israel could apply further military pressure on Hezbollah via a ground offensive into southern Lebanon. Such an operation has previously come up against resistance from Netanyahu’s cabinet, including Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. However, this scenario has increased in its likelihood over the last week, with reports from 16 September indicating that the war cabinet had told US officials that an offensive against Hezbollah had been approved. Although this option for Israel is likely to be kept in reserve to be utilised should Hezbollah remain in southern Lebanon, the reported movement of the IDF’s 98th Division to the north on 18 September is potentially a further sign of this eventuality coming into fruition. Although this course of action would present increased risk for Israel and stretch its forces as it remains committed to operations in Gaza, military planners could seek to launch such an operation to exploit challenges currently facing Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s actions in the future are less certain. The group increasingly appears either unwilling or unable to counter the IDF, it has also failed to launch significant retaliatory attacks against Israel despite bellicose rhetoric from its leader. There are numerous potential reasons for this. It is possible that Israel’s targeting of Hezbollah’s communication network, leadership, and military apparatus, over the last week has significantly impeded the group’s ability to coordinate and mount a response. However, given the precedent for militant groups being resilient to aerial campaigns – like the Yemeni Houthis during their years’ long war against the Saudi-led coalition – it is possible that a noteworthy Hezbollah capability remains, and that they and their allies are taking time to assemble a response. The group is known to possess a vast stockpile of missiles, rockets, and drones – as well as other systems – that can, in theory, threaten much of Israeli territory and potentially overwhelm Israel’s sophisticated air defences. As the effectiveness of Israeli airstrikes in degrading these capabilities is uncertain, a response involving these munitions cannot be ruled out.
Should Hezbollah continue to possess the intent and capability to mount a response, it will highly likely continue to avoid engaging in a decisive conflict by factoring in Israel’s possible response. Hezbollah could seek to demonstrate its ability to hit targets deep inside Israel to reestablish the deterrent effect of its long-range munition holdings. Due to the effectiveness of the Iron Dome, however, such an operation would either risk failure or require a weight of fire that would risk inflicting a significant level of destruction and, therefore, incite a strong response from Israel. The Hezbollah response could also come from or with the participation of, other Iranian-backed groups like the Houthis. This would allow for a strike against Israel that further signals anti-Israeli unity across Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance” whilst also reducing Hezbollah’s level of accountability.
Although Israel currently appears to hold the advantage over Hezbollah, with the group unlikely to leverage its full offensive capabilities, either out of its own intent or inability, the threat Lebanese group pose should not be ignored. The degree to which the group’s capabilities have been degraded is unknown and their desire to avoid an all-out confrontation will likely be deprioritised if faced with an existential threat such as one presented by a concerted IDF campaign. Therefore, those both in Israel and Lebanon should adequately prepare for a military escalation while being mindful of the potential regional ramifications.
Considerations
Those present in the region, particularly in Israel or Lebanon, should have contingency plans in place to negate some of the heightened risks currently present. A host of governments continue to urge their citizens to leave Lebanon immediately. Many airlines have cancelled or reduced their routes serving Lebanon and Israel due to the risk of conflict, reducing the availability of commercial options to depart both countries. A significant military exchange between Israel and Hezbollah would almost certainly see flights and aviation ground operations disrupted, possibly with little warning, while the targeting of aviation facilities could prompt prolonged disruption. Israel possesses significant defence capabilities, but the weapons arsenal of Hezbollah – as well as the Houthis and Iran – are substantial and would pose challenges to Israeli defence systems. Additionally, Israeli nationals abroad should exercise increased caution, with there being a possibility that a response is not carried out toward Israel proper and instead toward Israel’s interests and citizens abroad.