HomeInsights & ResourcesAlert:24The impact of Israel-Lebanon hostilities

The impact of Israel-Lebanon hostilities

Following the events of 7 October, Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah have engaged in a campaign of daily cross-border strikes that have been steadily increasing in their scale and intensity. Amid this, there have been several periods where developments have triggered more significant rounds of tit-for-tat military exchanges between Israel and its opponents, raising fears of a full-scale war in the region.

Such a period of heightened tension is currently playing out following a Hezbollah strike in the occupied Golan Heights on 27 July, which killed 12 children. This event constituted the deadliest attack on civilians in Israeli-controlled territory since fighting broke out between the two parties in October. This incident, which has been officially denied by the group, was met with immediate outrage in Israel, with many high-ranking members of the country’s political leadership vowing to respond severely.

Israel’s response began on the evening of 30 July, when a high-ranking member of Hezbollah was targeted in an Israeli strike on a building in southern Beirut. The status of the target, Fuad Shukur, right hand man to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, remains unconfirmed, although Israel has claimed he was killed. Shortly after, the United States (US)launched an attack on a Popular Mobilization Forces(PMF) base in Musayib, located in Iraq’s Babil province. The strike reportedly killed at least four PMF members of the Iran-backed group and injured several others. Washington stated the move was in self-defence, as the group were preparing to launch drones on US-led coalition bases in the region. Following this, in the early hours of 31 July, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran. Israel is widely believed to have assassinated Haniyeh, who had been a prominent figure in internationally-brokered ceasefire talks, further compounding fears of increased violence and hostilities in the region.

An Israeli response was largely anticipated against Hezbollah in Lebanon following the civilian deaths in the Golan Heights. However, the assassination of one of Hamas’s most important leaders would have been viewed as a much less likely reaction, with the fact that Haniyeh’s killing occurred in Tehran, further enhancing the incident’s escalatory potential. Israel’s actions have been condemned by Iran and its affiliated groups, along with Turkey, China, and Russia. Iran and its affiliates have also promised to retaliate. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has announced his country will “defend its territorial integrity, dignity, honour, and pride, and will make the terrorist occupiers regret their cowardly act”, while the country’s Revolutionary Guards has stated that they and their axis of resistance will respond “harshly” to the killing. Hamas have warned that the killing of Haniyeh “is a grave escalation” and Hezbollah has pledged to “increase the determination of resistance fighters across all resistance arenas.” The U.S. continues to make efforts to deescalate the heightened tensions, reiterating that while it does not believe all-out conflict is inevitable, it would help Israel defend itself if it was attacked.

Aviation operations in the region have been notably impacted as carriers attempt to negate the risks posed by the anticipated military response. Many airlines have stopped flying to and from Lebanon, and to a lesser extent Israel and Iran. Others have decided to reroute to avoid flying over Iranian and Iraqi airspace.  On 5 August, Iranian aviation authorities issued a warning over potential GPS interruptions, they also changed some routes over the country, affecting paths over western, southwestern, southern and central Iran.

Assessment & outlook


Currently, the potential for Israel and its opponents, particularly Hezbollah and Iran, to engage in rounds of extraordinary military exchanges that risk provoking a significant escalation is elevated. With Israel now having responded kinetically following the rocket attack on 27 July, the trajectory of the regional conflict is now seemingly in the hands of Hezbollah and Iran. It is highly likely that both parties will respond in the near-term, although the scale and intensity of this retaliation remains unclear. The targeted killings of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders are highly significant, yet they might not necessarily lead to a wider, all-out conflict.

The strikes could be viewed by Iran and Hezbollah as a demonstration that Israel has the capability to eliminate its opponent’s key senior leadership through highly targeted strikes across the region, should the scale of threats to Israel necessitate such. It is therefore possible that the nature of these assassinations will serve as a potent deterrent against robust retaliation, while the limited scope of the attacks – in a destructive sense – could signal that Israel is not seeking an all-out war. However, there is no guarantee that these assassinations will be interpreted this way by Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran – all of whom will undoubtedly have internal figures pushing to launch a comprehensive response.

In the best-case scenario, the response of Hezbollah, Iran, and other affiliated groups will be significant enough to satisfy the demands of their leadership and supporters yet sit below Israel’s escalation threshold and thereby allow for the situation to return to what can currently be considered a state of normalcy. As a large, coordinated missile, drone, and rocket attack currently seems like the most likely option Israel’s opponents will choose to respond with, this scenario would see most projectiles intercepted, as was the case during the Iranian attack of 13-14 April.

A worst-case scenario would be a large-scale and effective kinetic response from these actors toward Israel that evades the country’s defences (either by design or miscalculation), or potentially the targets nationals and/or interests abroad, that drives them to retaliate even stronger and place the situation into a spiral of uncontrollable escalation.

Ultimately, an all-out conflict lies largely outside the best interests of all involved parties, although there are likely segments of each actor’s leadership who desire this outcome. The challenge now for Iran and its proxies is to coordinate a response that does not lead to the outbreak of conflict, but at the same time restores a decent semblance of Tehran’s credibility. Indeed, the assassination of the Hamas commander in the Iranian capital has dealt a blow to the country’s reputation, particularly in a security sense, and could hinder its ability to project authority regionally if it does not respond in a sufficient manner. Moreover, while Iran does enjoy a degree of influence over Hezbollah, Hamas, and others, each of these actors have their own agency and cannot be guaranteed to act in the best interests of Iran, even despite their close links – adding a further layer of uncertainty.

Although the broader and ultimately more decisive response of Hezbollah and Iran remains unknown, an uptick in attacks from the Yemeni Houthis and Iran-backed militias in Iraq are highly likely. There isa very strong potential that the Houthis will step up their targeting of maritime vessels traversing the Red Sea in a demonstration of solidarity. Moreover, the U.S. military strikes conducted last week indicate that Washington is anticipating an increased level of attacks on its bases in Iraq and Syria, which had already come under five attacks in a 12-dayperiod before its pre-emptive strike against the Iraqi militiamen. There have also been numerous recent cases of alleged Iran-backed plots to target Israeli interests outside of the Middle East region, it therefore cannot be ruled out that Iran could attempt to enact further similar schemes to oppose Israel.

The worst-case scenario of uncontrollable escalation could conceivably lead to a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, which would have grave implications for both sides, as well as the wider region. Hezbollah has significant capabilities that would puta wide array of locations in Israel – including its major urban centres, as well as targets vital to the Israeli economy – under direct threat. This prospect could also potentially see Israel attempt to launch a major ground assault across the Lebanese border, as well as launch significant strikes on Hezbollah assets in the Lebanese capital on locations such as the Beirut-Rafic Al Hariri International Airport.  As things stand, this scenario is assessed as unlikely but cannot be ruled out entirely given the vast uncertainties and variables at play. These recent developments are also likely to impact negotiations over a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, with the assassinated Hamas leader having served as an important figure in these discussions. Talks over a ceasefire had been marred by difficulties prior to these latest events, meaning the chance of a deal being reached in the near-term now appears even more remote. Enduring conflict in Gaza will continue to have a detrimental effect on the regional security landscape, it will also prolong regional tensions even if the current spike is sufficiently deescalated.

Considerations

Those present in the region, particularly in Israel or Lebanon, should have contingency plans in place to negate some of the heightened risks currently present. The past week has seen a host of governments urge their citizens to leave Lebanon immediately, with many advising to leave via any route possible – signalling the level of threat many perceive to be facing the country currently. Many airlines have cancelled or reduced their routes serving Beirut due to the risk of conflict, reducing the availability of commercial options to depart the country in the event that the situation deteriorates further, while even a limited duration escalation between Israel and Hezbollah would almost certainly see flights and aviation ground operations further disrupted. Those in Israel should have plans in place to rapidly exit in case the situation worsens, the country has similarly seen a list of operators temporarily cease operations to and from its only international airport in Tel Aviv. Israel possesses significant defence capabilities, but the weapons arsenal of Hezbollah and Iran are significant and would pose serious challenges to Israeli defence systems. Additionally, Israeli nationals abroad should exercise increased caution, with there being a possibility that a response is not carried out toward Israel proper and instead targets Israel’s interests and citizens abroad.

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