Event overview
Significant levels of civil unrest over the disputed 9 October elections have sparked a rapid deterioration in Mozambique’s security environment. Since 11 October, main opposition candidate Venancio Mondlane of the Podemos party, challenging the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), has called for recurrent nationwide strikes and demonstrations, citing fraud in relation to Frelimo’s electoral victory. Bouts of significant civil unrest involving road-blockades, violent clashes with security personnel, vandalism, looting, and arson have been reported in most of Mozambique’s urban centers, though the greatest intensity has been witnessed in the capital, Maputo.
On 19 October, unrest intensified following the killing of two opposition party officials in the Bairro da Coop neighbourhood of Maputo by unknown gunmen that ambushed their vehicle. The likely politically motivated assassinations prompted international condemnation from United Nations and European Union (EU) officials. Between 18-26 October, security personnel stepped up the crackdown on rising levels of unrest driven by the killings including firing live rounds into protesters resulting in at least 10 deaths, 50 injuries, and over 400 arrests.
On 24 October, the National Electoral Commission confirmed Frelimo’s victory, though also warning the final judgement would likely rest with the Constitutional Court and reportedly admitting to the presence of inconsistencies. In response, Venancio Mondlane who has since reportedly escaped an assassination attempt in South Africa, called for a week-long demonstration between 31 October –7 November, mainly aimed at the National Electoral Commission and Frelimo offices in Maputo.
In an attempt to contain the heightened levels of civil unrest, the Mozambican government has disrupted internet access, with access restored on 4 November after the necessary conditions have been met. Transport and business disruptions prompted by civil unrest are assessed as severe. Road-blockades are frequently established by protesters targeting choke points to maximize disruption. Moreover, reports emerged on 4 October of protesters coercing road freight drivers on the South Africa-Mozambique border, specifically in Ressano Garcia, to block the N4 highway and reportedly had their keys taken by protesters. Public transport along the N4 highway was also reportedly disrupted. The N4 highway remains a critical route used to export chromite and ferrochrome to South Africa. Highway operators have advised traffic has partially resumed though likely remains susceptible to secondary risks associated with civil unrest. Additionally, the Maputo Katembe Bridge, an important logistical link for the Port of Maputo, is reportedly gridlocked due to road-blockades.
On 21 October, the Confederation of Economic Associations of Mozambique warned the ongoing disruption caused by widespread unrest and strikes has led to the direct loss of over $221 million, critically impacting the education, catering, tourism, and transport sectors. Officials of the Beira Port Terminal, Mozambique’s second most important port terminal after the Port of Maputo, advised the unrest has led to logistical disruptions with less than half of the average 700 freight trucks per day entering the port. Of note, the officials also noted that on relatively calmer days up to 2,000 freight trucks attempted to enter the terminal as companies rushed to take advantage of the relative calmness, causing significant congestion delays and impacting vessel loading times, leading to further disruption along the supply chain.
Assessment & outlook
The current high levels of unrest are expected to persist after the final protest that took place on 7 November in Maputo, anticipated to act as a flashpoint, with further road-blockades, vandalism, looting, and violent clashes between protesters and security forces likely. Unrest is also expected in Beira, and Nampula, as well as the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Zambezia. Localized unrest in other smaller urban centers remains a possibility, though will be highly targeted against government offices and assets.
Historically, Mozambique’s Constitutional Court has rejected almost all previous appeals related to election results and is therefore unlikely to change its position in the current electoral period. In previous cases, the Constitutional Court has prolonged hearings until the holiday period in December when the public’s focus shifts away from socio-political developments. As such, incidents of civil unrest are likely to persist up until December although will likely involve intermittent periods of relative calm, particularly in areas outside of Maputo. However, any further significant events, such as state-sponsored political assassinations, could act as a flashpoint for intensified bouts of unrest.
Venancio Mondlane will likely continue to leverage nationwide strikes against the ruling Frelimo government in a bid to undermine their rule or force them into possible negotiations, which could prolong business disruptions in Mozambique. However, political negotiations between the opposition and Frelimo are currently assessed as unlikely due to former’s reluctance to lose political ground and seek compromise.
Despite this, the government faces unprecedented pressure, both internally and externally, with further nationwide strikes possibly causing more damage to its political standing. Externally, EU officials and NGOs have called on Mozambique to release electoral data, and whilst no evidence has been identified that external funding provided to Mozambique is at risk, such a prospect coupled with a prospect of nationwide strikes could force the ruling Frelimo to consider negotiations or face collapse. Current funding exists in multiple forms though recently included a pledge of $22 million in March from the U.S. to help fight terrorism in the restive Cabo Delgado province in northern Mozambique.
On terrorism, the Islamist insurgency present in Cabo Delgado will likely gain from the political turmoil as state control wanes during the current period of instability. Socio-political grievances continue to act as recruitment drivers for terrorist groups in the province, with the recent elections serving to reinforce these factors and potentially propel recruitment rates.
Recommendations
Those operating in Mozambique should exercise caution and have contingency plans in place to negate some of the heightened risks currently present. Recommendations include (but not limited to):
• Postpone any nonessential travel to Mozambique until furthernotice.
• For those currently in Mozambique, minimize movement as much as possible, especially at night, and use secure transportation with experienced and approved security drivers when necessary.
• Individuals in Mozambique should refrain from by passing road blocks and should be prepared to modify their travel plans according to the fluidity of the security situation.
• Travelers and expatriates in Mozambique are advised to avoid large gatherings and protests to reduce the risk of unintended exposure to potential violence.
• Those remaining in Mozambique should secure adequate supplies of food, water, medication, and other essentials in case travel restrictions arise due to worsening security conditions.
• Individuals and organizations with interests in Mozambique should monitor the situation closely for changes in political and security dynamics.
• Strengthen the security of office facilities and ensure all vehicles are kept fully fueled.
• Prepare emergency departure kits for rapid evacuation and plan for potential early relocation of expatriates, dependents, and visitors.
• Prepare all personnel for possible relocation or evacuation depending on the evolving severity of the situation.